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ABSTRACT 
 
Concerns about the potential harm of the increased economic bond between the audit firm and the audit client 
resulting from the joint provision of audit and NAS have been investigated extensively in the audit literature. However, 
much of this research was conducted in developed countries’ settings, with very little, if any, carried out in the context 
of a developing country. The current study aims at filling this gap in audit research by investigating two important 
issues related to the joint provision using data from the Kuwaiti audit market. First, this study examines whether there 
is an association between the provision of NAS to the audit client and audit firm’s tenure as a surrogate of audit 
independence. Second, the current study aims at examining factors expected to influence clients’ purchase of NAS in 
the Kuwaiti audit market. Contrary to expectations, the results reveal a negative relationship between the joint 
provision and external audit firm’s tenure, suggesting that such a joint provision does not lead to the impairment of 
auditor independence. Results obtained from the NAS purchase logistic regression also show that audit client’s 
purchase of NAS from their audit firms is positively related to the amount of audit fees and client’s financial leverage.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he potential impact of the joint provision of Non-Audit Services (NAS) to audit clients on auditors’ 
independence has been a source of dispute for decades in the audit literature. This issue has attracted 
more attention even more in the wake of the wave of audit failures around the world during the 2000’s 
(e.g., Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco). Moreover, the significant increase in the proportion of revenues audit firms obtain 
from providing NAS to audit clients during the last two decades raised some concerns about the effect of the provision 
of such services on auditors’ independence (Levitt, 2000). Such concerns have motivated several rule-making bodies 
responsible for regulating the audit profession, especially in Western countries, to issue rules aimed at safeguarding 
auditors’ independence from the possibly negative effects of providing NAS to audit clients, including the famous 
U.S. Sarbanes & Oxley Act. Additionally, the joint provision issue has long attracted the interest of academics and 
has been a focus of investigation of extensive audit research (e.g., Simunic, 1984; Beck, Frecka, & Solomon, 1988b; 
Barkess & Simnett, 1994; Hay, Knechel, & Li , 2006;  Basioudis, Papakonstantinou, & Geiger, 2008; Davis & Hollie, 
2008; Ye, Carson, & Simnett, 2011; Klumpes, Komarev, & Eleftheriou, 2016;  Park, Choi, & Cheung, 2017). This 
line of audit research has typically sought examining whether the joint provision of audit and NAS to audit clients can 
lead to jeopardizing auditors’ independence.  
 
While a large number of audit studies have been carried out to examine the joint provision impact on auditor 
independence, there has been a disparity among these studies on how to measure such an impact. One approach that 
has been employed to assess the joint provision impact was to examine the relationship between the concurrent 
provision of NAS and audit firm's tenure. The idea is that since the joint provision strengthens auditors’ economic 
bond with the client, and hence the economic loss in case of dismissal by the client, this joint provision may place a 
greater pressure on the external audit firm to submit to the client’s inclinations (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic, 1984; 
Firth 1997; Schneider, Church, & Ely, 2006). It follows that auditors facing this kind of situations will be more willing 
to submit to the client's wishes (e.g., becomes less independent), and hence will be less likely to be changed by the 
audit client. This idea seems to be a plausible one, especially in light of findings reported in the audit literature 
T 
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suggesting that auditors are more sensitive to client’s pressures during the early years of audit engagement as they are 
still in the course of recovering their start-up costs (Iyer & Rama, 2004). Following this avenue of research, the current 
study attempts to assess the effect of the joint provision on auditors’ independence by examining whether the joint 
provision is associated with more incidences of audit firms being tenured by the audit client in the Kuwaiti audit 
market.  
 
Another interesting stream of the joint provision line of research was involved in investigating factors related to 
clients’ purchase of NAS from their audit firms (e.g., Parkash & Venable, 1993; Firth, 1997; Frankel, Johnson &, 
Nelson, 2002;  Ashbaugh, LaFond, & Mayhew, 2003; Ruddock & Taylor, 2005; Hay et al., 2006; Habib & Islam, 
2007). The review of this literature indicates that there has been very little research examining this issue in the 
developing countries settings. In an effort to expand this stream of audit research, the current study examines whether 
evidence about the determinants of audit clients' purchase of NAS documented in the developed countries' settings is 
applicable to a small developing country’s market like the Kuwaiti audit market. 
 
The current study is motivated by the scarcity of empirical research examining the potential impact of the joint 
provision of audit and NAS to audit clients on external auditors' independence in the developing countries' settings. 
While the audit literature is sated with studies examining the potential impact of the joint provision on auditor 
independence, most of these studies stem from Western and English-speaking counties (especially, the US, and the 
UK), and to date, research examining this important issue is still limited in the developing countries’ settings, and is 
virtually absent in the context of the Middle Eastern region. In addition, research examining audit tenure as a test of 
auditor independence is relatively little worldwide (Wang & Hay, 2013), and rare, if any, in developing countries’ 
settings (Wu & Ying, 2016). Moreover, and as indicated below, findings of prior research about the relationship 
between the joint provision and audit firm tenure are mixed and still inconclusive. It appears, therefore, that re-
examining this research issue is expected to be valuable in extending the audit literature by providing evidence about 
the effect of the joint provision on audit firm tenure from a developing country’s setting, which is the aim of the 
current study.  
 
The results of the current study reveal a negative association between clients’ purchase of NAS from their audit firms 
an external audit firm tenure. This finding is suggestive that the joint provision does not lead to compromising auditor’s 
independence.  The current study’s empirical results also reveal a positive relationship between audit client’s purchase 
of NAS form their external audit firm and both the amount of audit fees and client’s financial leverage.   
 
The remainder of the current study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some review of related previous research. 
Section 3 provides information about the study’s data and research methodology. The study’s results are presented in 
Section 4, while section 5 provides concluding remarks about the study.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Joint Provision and Auditor Tenure 
 
The joint provision of NAS to audit clients and the potential impact of that on audit quality (e.g., independence) has 
been one of the most examined issues in the audit literature for the last three decades. While studies in this stream of 
research have typically been interested in determining whether the concurrent supply of NAS to audit clients leads to 
harming auditor independence, these studies have used different ways for measuring the joint provision impact on 
auditor independence. For example, some studies (e.g., Barkess & Simnett, 1994; Wines, 1994; Craswell, 1999; 
Lennox, 1999) have tested whether the supply of NAS to audit clients is associated with less incidences of a qualified 
audit report, as a proxy of compromised auditor independence. Other studies (Sharma, 2001; Sharma & Sidhu, 2001; 
DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Geiger & Rama, 2003) have tried to examine the independence issue 
by testing whether the joint supply is significantly related to decreased likelihood of a going-concern opinion. A 
different group of audit studies investigated the joint provision impact on auditor independence through examining 
the association between such joint provision and audit report lags (e.g., Knechel & Payne, 2001; Knechel & Sharma, 
2008; Knechel, Sharma, & Sharma, 2012). Another group of studies in this line of research, which are of more interest 
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to the current study, has used the length of auditor tenure as a measure of the effect of the joint supply on auditor 
independence. The argument held by these studies is as follows: when the audit firm provides both audit and NAS to 
the audit client, the economic loss resulting from dismissal is potentially greater than if only audit services are provided 
(Simunic, 1984; Beck, Frecka, & Solomon, 1988a; Hillson & Kennelley, 1988). This issue has been investigated by 
several audit studies hypothesizing that audit firms providing both audit and NAS to the same client may be more 
likely to comply with client’s demands (i.e., compromise their independence) in order to ensure being tenured by the 
client (Beck et al., 1988b; DeBerg, Kaplan, & Pany,1991; Barkess & Simnett, 1994; Hay et al., 2006).  
 
Beck et al (1988a), for example, were among the earliest to discuss the relation between the joint provision of NAS 
and auditor tenure. In this article, the authors analytically demonstrated that the present value of the economic rents 
stemming from the joint provision (e.g., knowledge spillover) is lower in recurring audit engagement than in non-
recurring engagements. The authors argued that this makes the economic bond between the auditor and the audit client 
greater in earlier engagement years than in later ones. This elevated economic bond is said to provide auditors with an 
incentive to retain the audit client, and thus results in pressures to compromise their independence. In a related paper, 
Beck et al. (1988b) used a sample of US audit engagements to empirically examine of the relation between the joint 
provision of NAS and auditor tenure. Consistent with the incremental economic bonding hypothesis, the results of this 
study indicated that audit tenure is longer when NAS is provided by the incumbent audit firm1. DeBerg et al. (1991) 
performed a similar investigation by examining the relation between auditor change and the purchase of NAS using a 
sample of audit clients changing auditors (change group) and a matched sample of audit clients not changing auditors 
(non-change group). The results of this study indicated that the level of total, recurring, and nonrecurring NAS 
purchased were not significantly different between the change group and the non-change group. This study's findings, 
therefore, showed no evidence of an association between auditor change and the provision of NAS. Barkess and 
Simnett (1994) used a sample of Australian listed companies to examine, among other things, whether there is a 
relation between auditor tenure and the provision of NAS to audit clients. The results of this study revealed no evidence 
of a significant relationship between auditor tenure and the amount of NAS purchased. Using data related to U.S. audit 
engagements during the 2000-2002 period, Ghosh, Kallapur, & Moon (2006) carried out a similar study by examining 
the relation between auditor tenure and the provision of NAS. This study’s results showed a significant positive 
relationship between auditor tenure and the NAS fee ratio2. Hay et al. (2006) further investigated this issue in the New 
Zealand audit market by examining whether the provision of NAS to audit clients is associated with the length of 
auditor tenure. The results of this study indicated no significant relationship between auditor tenure and the provision 
of NAS. Ye et al. (2011) performed similar examination in the Australian market. Their results showed a significantly 
positive relationship between audit firm tenure and audit client’s purchase of NAS. Using a sample of publically listed 
New Zealand firms, Wang and Hay (2013) recently examined the relationship between the joint provision of NAS to 
audit clients and audit tenure. Their results revealed no evidence of such a relationship.  
 
It appears, therefore, that findings of prior research about the relationship between the joint provision and audit firm 
tenure are still inconclusive. The current study aims at extending this literature by further examining whether there is 
a significant effect of the joint provision on audit firm tenure using data related to a sample of audit engagements form 
the Kuwaiti audit market.  
 
  
																																								 																				
1 The results of tenure differences, however, were small, and held for only one year of the analyzed period of three years.  
2 The authors, however, interpreted this positive relationship to be a result of economic efficiencies from auditor's increased knowledge about the 
audited firm rather than an auditor-management 'collusion behavior'.    
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Factors Influencing the NAS Purchase 
 
The audit literature includes a stream of research that has been interested in studying factors that influence audit clients' 
purchase of NAS from their external auditors (Parkash & Venable, 1993; Firth, 1997; Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh 
et al., 2003; Ruddock & Taylor, 2005; Hay et al., 2006; Habib & Islam, 2007).  
 
In the US, Parkash and Venable (1993) were among the earliest to examine audit clients' NAS purchase behavior. 
Using data related to Fortun-500 companies, they examined and found evidence of a significant relationship between 
the amount of NAS purchased and audit clients' potential agency costs. Frankel et al. (2002) examined, among other 
things, factors influencing clients' purchase of NAS from external auditors. Their results indicated that poorly 
performing audit clients, as measured by ROA and stock returns, purchase more NAS, and that clients purchase of 
NAS is higher when the auditor is a Big-5 audit firm. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) performed a similar examination. Their 
results indicated, among other things, that the amount of NAS is higher when the audit client's leverage is high, and 
when the audit firm is a Big-5 one.  
 
Ruddock and Taylor (2005) investigated the joint provision impact on audit firm’s tenure in the Australian market. 
Their results indicated that the level of NAS purchased is negatively related to audit client’s profitability, as well as 
the proportion of assets in the form of inventory and receivables, but is positively related to client’s size. Firth (1997) 
used data related to UK audits to examine the relationship between the amount of NAS purchased and proxies of audit 
clients' agency costs. He found evidence that audit clients with higher agency costs tend to purchase lower levels of 
NAS, presumably in an effort to reassure their auditors' independence. 
 
Habib and Islam (2007) study is among the very few studies that examined the determinants of the NAS purchase in 
a developing-country audit market. Using data related to audit engagements in Bangladesh, this study investigated 
factors that influence the audit client's decision to purchase NAS. The findings of this study showed that the amount 
of NAS purchased are higher for larger audit clients, clients with high liquidity, clients with multinational subsidiaries, 
clients audited by audit firms with international links, while is lower for clients with high leverage.  
 
Using data related to 322 Swedish Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), Svanström and Sundgren (2012) 
further examined this issue. Their results showed that audit clients’ purchase of NAS from audit firms is positively 
associated with the length of the auditor-client relationship. Their results also showed that clients’ purchase of NAS 
is not derived by the agency cost variables.  
 
Although prior research's findings are inconclusive, they suggest that the level of NAS purchase is positively related 
to client's size and leverage, and is negatively related to the client's profitability.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The Provision of NAS and Auditor Tenure 
 
As indicted, one objective of the current study is to examine whether the auditor tenure, as a manifestation of auditor 
independence, is influenced by the concurrent provision of NAS to the audit client. To test such a research question, 
the current study uses a logistic regression model that is based on prior audit research (e.g., Hay et al., 2006; Wang & 
Hay, 2013). In particular, the following model is used to examine whether there is a significant relation between jointly 
providing NAS to the audit client and audit firm's tenure: 
 𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1	𝑁𝐴𝑆_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 + 𝑏2	𝐿𝑛𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑏3	𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝑏4	𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝑏5	𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + +𝑏6	𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 + 𝑒 (1) 
 
Where: 
 
TENURE : a dummy variable, taking the value of one if the audit firm is tenured for three or more 
years, and zero otherwise;  
NAS_RATIO : the ratio of NAS fee to the sum of audit and NAS fees, if any, paid to the audit firm. 
SIZE : natural log of the audit client’s total assets; 
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ROE : ratio of the client’s net income to total owners’ equity; 
CURRENT : ratio of the client’s current assets to current liabilities; 
DEBT : ratio of client's total debt to total assets. 
LOSS : a dummy variable taking the value of one if the audited firm reports loss for the year, 
and zero otherwise.  
e : error term. 
 
The dependent variable (TENURE) is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the audit firm is tenured 
for two or more years and zero if not. As shown, the independent variables in the model include the ratio of NAS fees 
to the sum of audit and NAS fees, if any, paid to the audit firm (NAS_RATIO), the natural log of the audit client's 
total assets (SIZE), the client’s return on equity (ROE), the client’s current ratio (CURRENT), and the debt-to-assets 
ratio (DEBT) of the audit client, and a dichotomous variable indicating whether the audited firm is incurring a loss 
(LOSS).  The experimental variable of particular interest is the NAS_RATIO variable. This variable is used to examine 
whether jointly providing NAS to audit clients is influential in audit firm’s tenure. If the provision of NAS to audit 
clients has an influence on auditor independence, and hence is associated with more incidences of auditor tenure, then 
we would expect the NAS_RATIO variable to have a significantly positive regression coefficient.     
 
Factor Influencing NAS Purchase 
 
The second objective of the current study is to examine factors that influence audit client's purchase of NAS from 
their audit firms. To examine this question, the following logistic regression model is used3: 
 𝑁𝐴𝑆 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1	𝐴𝑈𝐷_𝐹𝐸𝐸 + 𝑏2	𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐸𝑋 + 𝑏3	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑏4	𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝑏5	𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝑒 (2) 
 
Where, 
 
NAS : is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the audit client concurrently 
purchases NAS from the audit firm, and zero otherwise. 
AUD_FEE      : the natural log of audit fees; 
COMPLEX : audit complexity measured as (inventory + Acc. Receiv.) / Total Assets 
SIZE : natural log of the audit client’s total assets; 
ROE : ratio of the client’s net income to owners’ equity; 
DEBT : ratio of client's total debt to total assets. 
e : error term. 
 
As indicated from the model, the dependent variable (NAS) is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the 
audit client concurrently purchases NAS from their audit firms, and zero otherwise. This measure is used to examine 
whether the audit client's purchase of NAS is influenced by the independent variables included in the model. These 
variables are included in the model based on prior research findings that NAS purchase is significantly related to the 
amount of audit fees paid to the audit firm (e.g., Barkess & Simnett, 1994), client’s complexity of transactions (e.g., 
Hay et al., 2006), client's size (e.g., Geiger & Rama, 2003; Hay et al., 2006), and client’s risk (Hay et al., 2006). The 
AUD_FEE variable is a measure of the amount of audit fees paid by the audit client. The COMPLEX variable is a 
measure of audit client complexity. The SIZE variable is the natural log of client’s total assets, and is used to measure 
client’s size. The ROE is the ratio of the client’s net income to owners’ equity, while the DEBT variable is the ratio 
of the client’s total debt to total assets, and both variables are used as measures of client’s risk.   
 
Data 
 
The data used in the current study was collected by contacting six audit firms operating in the Kuwaiti audit market. 
A data gathering form was directed to contact names (e.g., partners or audit mangers) working in each audit firm, and 
was asked to provide the requested information about a random sample of 15 audit engagements performed by their 
																																								 																				
3 This model is based on prior auditing research examining factors influencing the purchase of NAS (e.g., Parkash and Venable, 1993; Firth, 
1997; Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ruddock and Taylor, 2005). 
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audit firm. The data gathering form included items designed to gather, among other things, data related to variables 
needed for the current study. These variables included the amount of non-audit fees paid by the audit client to their 
audit firms, the length of the auditor-client relationship, in addition to audit client’s financial statement information. 
Overall, data related to 57 engagements were received, representing 63 percent of the initial sample. Due to some 
missing data, however, observations related to 14 audit engagements were excluded from the study sample, resulting 
in a final sample of 43 engagements.   
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the study’s sample of audit engagements. As shown, the mean total assets of 
audited firms included in the study’s sample is about KD96 million (approximately $317 million)4. Compared to other 
related studies conducted in other countries (e.g., US., Australia, New Zealand), it seems that the sampled Kuwaiti 
firms are somewhat smaller. The results reported in Table 1 also show that the mean ratio of NAS fees to the sum of 
audit and NAS fees is about 38 percent, excluding observations with zero non-audit fees. The descriptive results also 
indicate that the liquidity of the sampled audited firms, measured by the current ratio, ranged from .19 to 52.3, with a 
mean current ratio of 1.14. Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics about the dichotomous variables included in the 
regression model. As shown, in about 80 percent of the sampled audit engagements, audit firms were tenured for three 
or more years, while were hired for two or less years in the remaining audit engagements. The table also shows that 
about 93 percent of the audited firms included in the study sample reported a profit, and only 7 percent were incurring 
a loss. Table 1 additionally shows that only 11.5 percent of the audited firms included in the sample concurrently 
purchased NAS from their auditors, while the rest hiring audit firms for financial statement audit only.   
 
Panels A and B in Table 2 provides the Pearson correlations among the dependent and independent variables used in 
the models 1 and 2, respectively. As Panel A in Table 2 shows, correlations between the independent variables in 
model 1 are fairly low, with the highest below 0.40, and with only two correlation coefficients that are statistically 
significant. Panel B in Table 2 shows the correlations between the independent variables in model 2. Although some 
of the correlations between the independent variables is somehow high, with the highest equal 0.691 between the 
AUD_FEE and SIZE variables, they are all below 0.80, and therefore should not pose concerns of biased regression 
estimates (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1988).  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (n=43) 
Continuous Variables Minimum Maximum Mean S. D. 
NAS_RATIO* 0.25 0.69 0.384 1.8047 
Non-audit Services Fees (KD)* 1,000 5,000 3,150 1799 
Audit Fees (KD) 500 15,000 3,821 3,622 
COMPLEX 0.00 0.97 0.367 0.29872 
Total Assets (KD) 140,080 772,016,000 96,396,508 183,829,048 
ROE -0.14 29.26 1.4914 4.63027 
CURRENT 0.19 52.35 4.1437 7.97116 
DEBT 0.08 0.9 0.4142 0.2222 
Dichotomous Variables Value Frequency %  
TENURE 0 9 21  1 34 79  
LOSS 0 40 93  1 3 7  
NAS 0 38 88.4  1 5 11.6  
* excluding observations with zero non-audit fees.  
 
  
																																								 																				
4 At the time the current empirical analysis was conducted, the currency exchange rate was approximately KD1 = $3.30. 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation 
Panel A: 
 Tenured NAS_RATIO SIZE ROE Current DEBT LOSS 
TENURE 1       
NAS_RATIO 0.122 1      
SIZE -0.189 0.090 1     
ROE -0.102 -0.039 -.337* 1    
CURRENT 0.005 -0.114 -0.072 -0.052 1   
DEBT -0.264 .396** 0.078 0.217 -0.250 1  
LOSS -0.141 -0.091 0.098 -0.093 -0.024 -0.246 1 
 
Panel B: 
 NAS AUD_FEE COMPLEX SIZE ROE DEBT 
NAS 1      
AUD_FEE 0.218 1     
COMPLEX -0.004 -0.381* 1    
SIZE 0.135 0.691** -0.446** 1   
ROE -0.028 -0.174 0.279 -0.337* 1  
DEBT 0.368* -0.132 0.105 0.078 0.217 1 
*, ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively (2-tailed). 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 provides the results of model 1, the Audit Tenure logistic regression. As Table 3 shows, the overall percentage 
of correct classification of cases provided by the model is about 61 percent, and the model’s Chi-square is 27.531 and 
is significant (p-value < .000). As shown in this table, the regression coefficient of the NAS_RATIO variable, which 
is used to examine the relation between the non-audit services provided to the audit client and audit firm’s tenure, is 
statistically significant (p-value < .047), but contrary to expectation has a negative sign5. Such a result not only do not 
provide support for the research hypothesis of a positive relationship between the provision of NAS to audit clients 
and audit firm’s tenure, but also indicate that in general the audit relation between audit clients and audit firms is 
shorter when the audit firm provides both audit and NAS. The results in Table 3 also indicate that the regression 
coefficients of the SIZE variable is statistically significant (p-value < .004) and has a positive sign, indicating the audit 
firm tenure is more common for larger firms. This result is consistent with findings reported in prior related research 
(e.g. Geiger & Rama, 2003; Hay et al., 2006) of a positive relationship between audit firm tenure and the size of the 
audited firm. The results in Table 3 also show that the regression coefficients of the ROE and DEBT independent 
variables have positive signs and are both statistically significant, suggesting that firms with higher profitability and 
with higher leverage tend to keep their audit firms more often. These results are somehow problematic in the sense 
that audit client’s profitability and leverage were used as measures of client’s risk, and that while high profitability 
indicate lower risk, high leverage indicate higher risk. Such results also suggest that client’s profitability and leverage 
in similar contexts might not be mere proxies for client risk, and that they should be looked at as two separate 
constructs. As indicated in Table 3, the regression coefficients of the CURRENT and LOSS control variables are 
statistically insignificant.  
 
  
																																								 																				
5 Although the negative sing of the regression coefficient contradicts with the study’s prediction of a positive sign, such a result is similar to 
results reported in other prior related studies (e.g. Hay, 2006; Wang and Hay, 2013).  
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Table 3. The “Audit Tenure” Logistic Regression Results 
TENURE = b0 + b1 NAS_RATIO + b2 LnSIZE + b3 ROE  + b4 CURRENT + b5 DEBT + + b6 LOSS+ e 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Wald p-value
 
NAS_RATIO -7.661 3.959 0.047** 
SIZE 0.931 8.339 0.004*** 
ROE 0.868 3.118 0.077* 
CURRENT 0.128 0.551 0.458 
DEBT 13.516 8.030 0.005*** 
LOSS 2.725 1.907 0.167 
Constant  -21.167 9.431 0.002 
Regression summary statistics    
Model Chi-square 27.531 (sig. < .000)  
-2 log likelihood 30.182   
Overall correct classification percentage 60.5%   
Cox & Snell R-square .473   
Nagelkerke R-square .640   
Number of observations 43   
 ***, **,  *   p-value of statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.               
Note: 
TENURE : a dummy variable, taking the value of one if the audit firm is tenured for three or more years, and zero otherwise; 
NAS_RATIO : the ratio of non-audit fee to audit fees paid by the audit client. 
SIZE : natural log of the audit client’s total assets; 
ROE : ratio of the client’s net income to owners’ equity; 
CURRENT : ratio of the client’s current assets to current liabilities; 
DEBT : ratio of client's total debt to total assets. 
LOSS : a dummy variable, taking the value of one if the audited firm reports loss for the year, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
Table 4 shows that results of model 2, the NAS Purchase logistic regression. As this table shows, the overall percentage 
of cases classified correctly by the model is about 88 percent. The model’s Chi-square is 19.334 and is significant (p-
value < .002). The regression coefficients of the AUD_FEE independent variable is positive and is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level (p-value < .093). This result indicates that audit client’s purchase of NAS from their audit 
firms is positively related to the level of audit fees. One possible explanation of such a positive relationship is that the 
amount of audit fees paid to audit firms represents the quality of their professional services. The regression coefficient 
of the DEBT independent variable is also positive and is statistically significant (p-value < .032). This result suggests 
that firms with higher financial leverage tend to concurrently purchase NAS from their audit firms more often, and is 
consistent with findings reported in prior related studies (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003). As the results in Table 4 show, 
the regression coefficients of the COMPLEX, SIZE, and ROE independent variables are statistically insignificant.   
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Table 4. The “NAS Purchase” Logistic Regression Results 
  ***, **,  *   p-value of statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.               
Note: 
NAS : a dummy variable taking the value of one if the audit client concurrently purchases NAS from audit firm, and zero 
otherwise; 
AUD_FEE : the natural log of audit fees; 
COMPLEX : audit complexity measured as (inventory + Acc. Receiv.) / Total Assets 
SIZE : natural log of the audit client’s total assets; 
ROE : ratio of the client’s net income to owners’ equity; 
DEBT : ratio of client's total debt to total assets. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
To check the robustness of the results found using the original NAS purchase regression model, a sensitivity analysis 
is performed. In particular, a new variable, NAS_FEE representing the natural log of NAS fees is used as a measure 
of the model’s dependent variable. The new regression model is re-run, and the results obtained from this new research 
model are provided in Table 5. As shown from this table, the model is generally significant (p-value < .061), and the 
R2 of the new model is .24. The results obtained from the new NAS regression model show that the regression 
coefficients of the ROE and the DEBT independent variables are both positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 
significance level. This suggests audit clients with higher profitability tend to concurrently purchase higher amounts 
of NAS from their audit clients. The results also suggest the same when audit client has a high financial leverage. 
Unlike results obtained from the original “NAS purchase” logistic regression model, the results show that the 
AUD_FEE variable is statistically insignificant. One possible explanation for these different results is that the amount 
of audit fees paid to audit firms might be influential in audit client’s decision to purchase NAS, but not the amount of 
these services. The results form Table 5 also indicate that, like in the original model, the COMPLEX and SIZE 
variables are statistically insignificant.  
 
  
NAS = b0 + b1 AUD_FEE + b2 COMPLEX + b3 SIZE + b4 ROE + b5 DEBT + e 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Wald p-value
 
AUD_FEE 19.588 2.828 0.093* 
COMPLEX -4.217 0.720 0.396 
SIZE -1.674 1.190 0.275 
ROE -0.151 0.768 0.381 
DEBT 28.697 4.611 0.032** 
Constant -58.019 3.960 0.047** 
Regression summary statistics: 
Model Chi-square 19.334 (sig. < .002)  
-2 log likelihood 11.578   
Overall correct classification percentage 88.4%   
Cox & Snell R-square .362   
Nagelkerke R-square .706   
Number of observations 43   
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Table 5. The “NAS Purchase” OLS Regression Results 
NAS_FEE = b0 + b1 AUD_FEE + b2 COMPLEX + b3 SIZE + b4 ROE + b5 DEBT + e 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value
 VIF 
Intercept -3.326 1.876 -1.772 0.085*   
AUD_FEE 0.160 0.612 0.262 0.795 1.310 
COMPLEX -0.111 0.119 -0.940 0.354 2.487 
SIZE -0.034 0.039 -0.888 0.380 1.265 
ROE 2.342 0.785 2.984 0.005** 1.190 
DEBT 
Model: 
R-Square =  .240 
F-statistic = 2.338 
Signif. F < .061 
n = 43 
1.337 0.656 2.038 0.049** 2.130 
**, *  p-value of statistical significance at the 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively 
Note: 
NAS_FEE : the natural log of NAS fees; 
AUD_FEE : the natural log of audit fees; 
COMPLEX : audit complexity measured as (inventory + Acc. Receiv.) / Total Assets 
SIZE : natural log of the audit client’s total assets; 
ROE : ratio of the client’s net income to owners’ equity; 
DEBT : ratio of client's total debt to total assets. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The question of whether auditors’ independence is compromised when the audit firm provides NAS to their audit 
clients has been a subject of debate among audit professionals, regulators, and researchers for a long period of time 
and in several countries. Audit firm’s joint provision of NAS to audit clients has provoked concerns about the potential 
impact of that on the soundness of auditors’ independence.   
 
Although the audit literature is replete with research conducted to examine the impact of the joint provision impact on 
auditor independence, there has been a scarcity of and a need for carrying out research to investigate this issue in the 
developing countries settings (Wu & Ying, 2016). Moreover, empirical research electing to examine audit firm tenure 
as a test of the joint provision's impact on audit independence has been very little, if any, outside the context of 
developed English-speaking counties. Likewise, empirical evidence about the determinants of audit clients’ purchase 
of NAS has been rare outside the Western countries’ audit markets. Therefore, the current study aims at filling this 
gap in prior research by providing empirical evidence about these important research questions in a developing 
country’s context. In particular, the current study uses a sample of Kuwaiti audit engagements to perform two research 
examinations. First, the current study tests the association between the joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
to the audit client and the incidences of audit firm's tenure, as a proxy for auditor independence. Secondly, the present 
study investigates factors that influence firms’ purchase of NAS from their external auditors.  
 
The study’s results in general show that the joint provision of audit and NAS to audit clients is not associated with 
longer audit tenure. In fact, the results reveal a negative relationship between the joint provision and audit tenure. The 
negative relationship between the joint provision and audit firm’s tenure suggests that providing NAS do not lead to 
harming external auditors’ independence. The study’ results also indicate that audit client’s purchase of NAS from 
their audit firms is positively related to the amount of audit fees paid, and the client’s financial leverage. 
 
The current study is subject to several limitations. First, the study’s sample is relatively small, which has inevitably 
led to weakening the statistical power of the tests applied. Therefore, further research with larger sample sizes needs 
to be conducted in developing countries’ settings to validate the research findings reported in the current study. 
Secondly, the dependent variable, TENURE, is a dichotomous variable, and hence does not provide insight about the 
effect of the length of audit tenure. Future similar research therefore could be conducted to examine this research issue 
using continuous dependent variables reflecting the years of audit tenure. The current study uses audit tenure as a 
measure of audit independence when investigating the effect of the joint provision. Future research is also needed to 
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re-examine the joint provision impact on audit independence in the context of developing countries other measures, 
such as incidences of qualified or modified audit opinion, going-concerns opinions, or audit report lags. 
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